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This study presents two tests of the hypothesis that adoption of an internal
ratings-based approach to determining minimum capital requirements,
proposed as part of the Basel II capital accord, would cause adopting banking
organizations to increase their acquisition activity. The study employs U.S.
data and focuses on the advanced internal ratings-based approach, as
proposed for banking organizations in the United States. The first test
estimates the relationship between excess regulatory capital and subsequent
merger activity, including organization and time fixed effects, while the
second test employs a “difference in difference” analysis of the change in
merger activity that occurred the last time U.S. regulatory capital standards
were changed. Estimated coefficients and observed differences have signs
consistent with the hypothesis, but results are either statistically insignificant
or imply differences that are small in magnitude.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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The Basel II capital accord is expected to change fundamentally the way that
the minimum regulatory capital requirements of many banking organizations
throughout the world are determined. One of the key elements of this accord
is the anticipated introduction of two internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches
to regulatory capital requirements. These differ substantially from the Basel I
approach and the proposed standardized approach under Basel II in that
a banking organization’s internal assessments of key risk considerations serve
as primary inputs in the calculation of minimum capital requirements.
Because these IRB approaches are based on banks’internal assessments using
systems validated by supervisors, they offer the benefit of more risk-sensitive
regulatory capital requirements.
Two IRB approaches have been proposed. The foundation IRB (F-IRB)
approach allows banks to use internal assessments for some risk components
and requires them to use regulatory prescribed values for others.
The advanced IRB (A-IRB) approach permits banks to use more of their own
internal risk assessments. Both IRB approaches will require banks to employ
sophisticated risk-measurement techniques that involve a statistical and
quantitative assessment of risk, but the demands and complexity of the A-IRB
approach are greater than those of the F-IRB approach.
Under the current proposal for banking organizations in the United States,
organizations with total banking (and thrift) assets of at least $250 billion or
at least $10 billion in on-balance-sheet foreign exposure – about ten large
organizations based on current balance sheets – would be required to adopt
A-IRB.
1 Other banking organizations may also choose to adopt A-IRB,
provided they have developed the necessary infrastructure to measure and
manage risk. While any bank may “opt in” if it meets regulatory standards,
only a few of the largest U.S. banking organizations initially are expected to
have in place the infrastructure required to employ such techniques, implying
that the A-IRB approach likely will be used at the outset only by a small group
of the largest banking organizations. If banks that do not adopt the A-IRB
approach continue to be subject to regulatory capital rules based on Basel I,
the result would be a bifurcated system in which the largest banking
9
1 See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (September 2003).organizations would be subject to the more risk-sensitive and flexible method
of determining minimum regulatory capital requirements. It is anticipated that
a number of larger banking organizations will join the initial set relatively
soon after the implementation date.
In Europe, the application of Basel II is expected to involve more alternatives,
as banks will likely have the option of adopting the F-IRB, A-IRB, or
standardized approach.
2 Because F-IRB requires fewer internally generated
inputs, the option of using this methodology should make it possible for less
complex banks to implement an IRB approach to capital requirements.
European banks that opt not to adopt an IRB approach will be able to use the
standardized approach, which is simpler and less risk sensitive than either of
the IRB approaches.
While adoption of an IRB approach may raise the regulatory capital
requirements for some IRB banks, it is likely to result in somewhat lower
minimum regulatory capital requirements, on average, for the banking
organizations that will avail themselves of these approaches, relative to the
minimum regulatory capital requirements applied to the majority of banks
that initially will not.
3 Concerns have been raised that this disparity would
provide an undue competitive advantage to the initial adopters, many of
which will be very large banking organizations. Concerns have also been
raised that both the excess regulatory capital that would be created at IRB
organizations as a result of reduced capital requirements and the
aforementioned competitive advantage associated with those reduced
requirements would fuel their acquisitions of non-adopting banking
organizations. Such concerns have not been the subject of empirical
examination. In this paper, we bring data to bear on the second of these
concerns: that banking organizations that adopt IRB will aggressively acquire
other banking organizations.
4
While this issue is relevant to the implementation of Basel II in Europe and
elsewhere throughout the world, we restrict our focus in this paper to potential
effects on merger activity of the implementation of Basel II in the United
10 Introduction
2 See Commission of the European Communities (2004).
3 See “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised
Framework,” which was issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for
International Settlements, in June 2004.
4 Berger (2004) examines the potential competitive effects of Basel II in the United States on
banks in credit markets for small and medium size enterprises.States, where a bifurcated system is expected to develop with a relatively few
very large banks adopting A-IRB and many, smaller banks not adopting
A-IRB. There are two primary consequences of adopting an IRB approach to
capital requirements that suggest to some observers that IRB banking
organizations would increase acquisition activity. Arguments based on these
consequences may be usefully designated as “excess regulatory capital” and
“relative capital advantage” arguments. 
“Excess regulatory capital” arguments assert that merger activity would
increase as a result of the excess regulatory capital that would be created by
the lower capital requirements stemming from adoption of IRB, and this
could fuel acquisitions for a number of different reasons. For example, in the
United States, a bank holding company (BHC) desiring to engage in a certain
acquisition may be deterred under current capital requirements, because the
merger might cause the combined entity to violate existing capital standards.
However, a reduction in regulatory requirements and a consequent increase in
excess regulatory capital might encourage the acquisition by significantly
reducing the likelihood of the combined BHC failing to meet the new, more
lenient capital standards.
Another example of an “excess regulatory capital” argument is that, with an
increase in excess regulatory capital, adopters could increase their return on
equity (ROE) by increasing the amount of earning assets against which
a given amount of capital is held (or reducing capital held against a given
amount of earning assets). Increased ROE may in turn raise bank valuation,
which could facilitate an increase in acquisition activity.
The focus of “relative capital advantage” arguments is on the difference in the
capital standards applied to IRB and other banking organizations, maintaining
that lower capital requirements for organizations operating under IRB,
relative to those operating under existing standards, would result in increased
acquisition activity. Specifically, in the U.S. context, some have alleged that
A-IRB BHCs would have an incentive to acquire banks not subject to A-IRB
capital standards because target banks would be worth more to A-IRB BHCs
than to current owners. Different valuations would exist because A-IRB
BHCs are expected to face regulatory capital requirements that would be
lower than those of the banking organizations that they might acquire.
Consequently, A-IRB BHCs could acquire non-adopters and increase the
return on equity associated with the acquired assets by either increasing
Introduction 11income-earning assets without adding capital or holding less capital against
the newly acquired assets.
5
Both “excess regulatory capital” and “relative capital advantage” arguments
rely on the assumption that current regulatory capital requirements are
“binding” in the sense that banking organizations are restricted from doing
what they would otherwise do in the absence of current minimum capital
regulations. Regulatory capital requirements would not be binding if
market-based considerations dictated higher levels of capital than those
imposed by regulation, or if, as some have argued, “capital arbitrage”
techniques currently employed by some larger banking organizations allow
them largely to avoid, with minor costs, the constricting effects of existing
minimum regulatory capital requirements.
6 However, much of the extensive
discussion of the risk implications of Basel II presumes that, at least during
crucial periods, capital requirements can be binding and thus influence bank
behavior regarding risk.
7
Ultimately, the question of whether adoption of the Basel II capital accord
will result in a substantial increase in merger activity by banking
organizations using an IRB approach must be assessed by examining relevant
data. The best approach, were it available, would be to examine the results of
previous reductions in regulatory capital requirements that applied to some
banking organizations but not to others, and assess whether substantial
relative increases in the acquisition activity of those granted the reduction
occurred as a result of the change. Since no such reduction in capital
requirements has taken place in recent decades in the United States, which is
the focus of this study, we must assess the issue by pursuing less definitive,
but nonetheless informative, approaches.
Specifically, we conduct two different types of tests on U.S. banking data.
The first type of test uses recent data on merger activity and BHC capital
ratios to determine if, all else equal, large banking organizations with greater
12 Introduction
5 Although other arguments for a positive relationship between IRB status and acquisition
activity can be made, we believe that the primary reasons that acquisition activity may be affected
by IRB depend on “excess regulatory capital” and the “relative capital advantage.” An example of
an alternative explanation is that the market values the improved ability to measure and manage
risk associated with adopting IRB, thereby raising the valuation of IRB organizations and enabling
them to increase their acquisition activity. In addition, the costs and benefits associated with an
IRB approach could influence decisions by banks not using an IRB approach to merge with each
other. This study does not examine the effect of IRB on mergers of this type.
6 See Jones (2002) for a detailed discussion.
7 See in particular Danielsson, et. al. (2001).excess regulatory capital exhibit a greater tendency to subsequently acquire
other banks. Such a finding would be consistent with the argument that
allowing large banking organizations to operate under lower capital
requirements (and thereby increase excess regulatory capital) would result in
expanded acquisition activity on their parts. This approach, however, is
subject to several sources of potential endogeneity bias, only some of which
are eliminated by the fixed-effects statistical procedure that we employ.
In part for this reason, we also conduct a test based on observations of what
happened the last time that capital standards in the United States changed
substantially for banks. It is argued that the advent of “prompt corrective
action” (PCA) standards, instituted in the early 1990s, increased capital
requirements for banks, a change that was in the opposite direction of the
reduction of regulatory minimum capital requirements that is expected to
occur, on average, for BHCs that adopt the A-IRB approach.
8 Taking a sample
of large BHCs that did not appear to be constrained by the capital
requirements in effect before the advent of PCA, and, further, would not have
been constrained under the pre-PCA capital standards after the adoption of
PCA, we compare the change (from the period before to the period after PCA)
in merger activity exhibited by those BHCs that did and did not become
capital constrained after more stringent regulatory capital standards became
relevant. A finding that BHCs constrained by the advent of PCA standards
reduced their merger activity by more (or increased it by less) than those not
so constrained would be supportive of the hypothesis that relaxation of
regulatory capital requirements (as anticipated, on average, for banking
organizations that adopt an IRB approach) would result in greater merger
activity by IRB organizations.
Our tests are more relevant to the “excess regulatory capital” arguments for
increased merger activity by IRB banking organizations than for “relative
capital advantage” arguments. However, as discussed below, a number of
studies have been conducted that are not supportive of “relative capital
advantage” arguments. The results of this literature almost uniformly reject
the hypothesis that acquirers seek to purchase more highly capitalized targets
–afinding that is not consistent with the notion that acquirers prefer targets
with greater potential for ROE improvement from increased leverage.
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8 Although the capital standards of “prompt corrective action” are relevant for banking
institutions, not bank holding companies, the amount of capital held by bank holding companies
should be affected by the “prompt corrective action” standards.The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II discusses the literature relevant
to the relationship between bank merger activity and capitalization. Section
III describes the proposed empirical tests, section IV describes the samples,
data, and variables, and section V presents empirical results. A final section
summarizes and concludes. To preview results, we do not find convincing
evidence that past levels of excess regulatory capital or past changes in capital
requirements have had a substantial effect on merger activity. Results of the
two tests suggest relationships that are in the direction consistent with the
concern that a reduction in minimum capital requirements for banking
organizations that adopt IRB would result in increased merger activity on
their part, but, with a few exceptions, results are not statistically significant.
When results are statistically significant, relevant magnitudes are found to be
quite small.
14 IntroductionII. Relevant Literature
A very large literature has addressed the question of why banking
organizations acquire other banking institutions.
9 Several reasons that banks
merge have emerged from this literature, and these same reasons are also
commonly cited by bankers and other industry analysts.
10 Specifically, the
prospects for increased efficiency and gains from diversification are
frequently cited as key determinants of acquisition activity, and studies in
both Europe and the United States have investigated whether these benefits
are in fact realized as a result of mergers.
11 Interestingly, capital is rarely cited
as an important issue in the question of why banks merge. Indeed, few studies
have sought to investigate the role of capital, especially that of the
acquirer’s capitalization relative to regulatory requirements. The scarcity of
such studies likely reflects the belief that such considerations play a minor
role at best in explaining mergers in the banking industry.
The only study that we know of to investigate the acquiring
institution’s capitalization as a determinant of merger activity was conducted
by O’Keefe (1996), who found that acquirers in the large sample of banks that
he investigated had significantly lower equity capitalization rates than their
nonacquiring peers. Because it suggests that better capitalized banks are less
likely to acquire other banks, this finding does not support “excess regulatory
capital” arguments that banking organizations, holding increased excess
regulatory capital as a result of reductions in minimum regulatory capital
requirements, would increase the rate at which they acquire other banking
organizations. O’Keefe’s sample, however, is not restricted to the very large
bank holding companies of concern in this study, so this finding may have
limited relevance to the behavior of the BHCs that adopt an IRB approach.
Several studies report evidence relevant to “relative capital advantage”
arguments, which our empirical tests do not address very directly. These
arguments, as noted above, assert that, with lower capital requirements than
15
9 For comprehensive reviews, see Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999), Dermine (1999), and
Group of Ten (2001), available at www.bis.org. 
10 Of particular importance to the U.S. banking industry, relaxation of longstanding interstate
banking restrictions is widely believed to have sparked extensive consolidation of an industry that
was decentralized for over one hundred years.
11 See, for example, Altunbas, Molyneux, and Thornton (1996), Vander Vennet (1996),
Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997), and Amel et. al. (2004).those of their potential targets, banking organizations employing an IRB
approach would have an incentive to acquire these better capitalized targets
and increase the return on equity associated with target assets by reducing the
capital held against those assets. An implication of this argument for past
merger behavior is that acquirers should have found more highly capitalized
banks relatively more attractive as acquisition targets.
Afairly large number of studies report results that contradict this implication.
We  know of at least six studies – Hannan and Rhoades (1987), Amel and
Rhoades (1989), O’Keefe (1996), Moore (1997), Wheelock and Wilson
(2000), and Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004) – that sought to determine
the characteristics of banking organizations that make them more likely to be
a target in a future bank acquisition and that also included the
bank’s capitalization as a potential determinant. Using various time periods
and various samples, five of these six studies find that more highly capitalized
banks are less likely, not more likely, to be acquired, all else equal. The sixth
study, by Akhigbe, Madura, and Whyte (2004), finds that more capitalized
banks are more likely to be acquired, but it differs from the other cited studies
in that the sample of targets employed is restricted to relatively large, publicly
traded banking organizations. Although the reason for the more common
finding of an inverse relationship between target capital ratios and likelihood
of acquisition is not clear, the finding is clearly not consistent with the
“relative capital advantage” argument.
Another study, by Houston, James, and Ryngaert (2001), addresses in
a different way the role of capital as a motivation for bank mergers. As a part
of their study, the authors obtained from both managers and analysts opinions
and, in some cases, estimates of the sources of expected merger-related gains.
Of the 41 mergers on which such information could be obtained, capital
structure benefits were noted in only five cases. In four of these cases,
analysts noted that the merger might enable the combined bank to free up
excess capital, a benefit that would be consistent with “relative capital
advantage” arguments. However, because capital is cited in such a small share
of the acquisitions in their analysis, their findings seem to suggest that capital
has not played a major role in explaining why banks make acquisitions.
16 Relevant LiteratureIII. Empirical Tests
Test 1. Our first test requires estimation of the relationship between BHC
capitalization and subsequent BHC merger activity in the United States, using
data obtained for recent years. The rationale for this test rests on the
presumption that some banking organizations in the recent past have, for
whatever reason, found themselves in the position of having capital in excess
of the level that they would hold because of regulatory capital requirements,
while other banking organizations have found themselves with no such excess
and thus may have been constrained by regulatory capital requirements.
The level of capital that BHCs feel bound to maintain because of regulatory
requirements may include some additional “cushion” above the required
regulatory minimums. Such cushions may be maintained for protection
against poor performance or other unanticipated events, and the size of this
cushion may differ from one BHC to another, depending on the BHC’s risk
and other factors.
12
With this in mind, we seek in this test to determine if BHCs that find
themselves with excess regulatory capital exhibit a greater subsequent
tendency to acquire other banking organizations than do BHCs that are more
constrained by regulatory requirements. The finding of a positive relationship
between observed capital ratios and merger activity or the finding of
a discreet increase in merger activity at some level of capitalization
representing a plausible critical level, would be consistent with the
predictions of “excess regulatory capital” arguments that relaxation of capital
constraints leads to more merger activity.
13
17
12 There is ample evidence that most BHCs choose to maintain some kind of cushion or buffer
above minimum regulatory requirements and that its size depends on portfolio characteristics and
other factors. See, for example, Hancock and Wilcox (2002). 
13An increase in capital could lead to less, rather than more, merger activity if BHCs with low
capital ratios engage in greater acquisition activity than better capitalized BHCs. This could occur
because weakly capitalized organizations may purchase highly capitalized targets to increase the
capitalization of the combined entity, relative to the pre-merger acquirer. If raising capital levels
is a motivation for some mergers, then test results will reflect these mergers, which could obscure
the effect of acquisition activity that was conducted for reasons consistent with “excess regulatory
capital” arguments. To the extent that such differing types of mergers take place, we believe that
results that reflect the average mix of these different types of mergers are the most relevant for
understanding the potential effects of IRB.A point that bears emphasizing, however, is that if the level of capitalization
required by the market were greater than that dictated by regulation, or,
equivalently, if capital arbitrage allowed BHCs to circumvent regulatory
capital requirements with little cost, then there would be little reason to expect
a relationship between excess regulatory capital and merger activity.
We  can test for this hypothesized relationship by estimating the following
relationships:
M
i = β 0 + β 1(K/A)
I + β 2X+   ε i , and (1)
M
i = α 0 + α 1KA1 + α 2KA2 + .. + α nKAn + α n+1X+ µ i , (2)
where M
i denotes the level of merger activity of BHCi, (K/A)
i denotes its
capital asset ratio, and KA1, KA2,...KAn denote binary variables that receive
values of 1 if (K/A)
i is in a defined range of values and zero otherwise.
Equation (1) imposes a linear relationship between M
i and  (K/A)
i, while
equation (2) allows the relationship to vary across different ranges of
(K/A)
i but not to vary within those ranges. The vector X denotes other
explanatory variables that may influence observed merger activity, and ε i and
ui denote error terms. Finding that β 1>0 in estimations of (1) would be
consistent with the hypothesis that merger activity increases with
capitalization (and equivalently, excess regulatory capital), and finding that
coefficients on KA1, KA2, ..., KAn are positive and increasing in magnitude
as capitalization increases would also be consistent with the hypothesis.
If, as noted above, different BHCs set different cushions above the regulatory
minimum, estimates of (2) could not be used to identify some critical level of
capital below which BHCs are constrained. Under these circumstances,
a given binary variable might correctly classify one BHC as not being bound
by regulatory requirements, while incorrectly classifying another BHC that
was, because of a higher cushion, in fact constrained by such requirements.
Biased estimates attributable to various forms of endogeneity are an
important concern in assessing the results of estimations of (1) and (2). Any
unobservable characteristic of BHCs that influences both the propensity of
a BHC to acquire other banking organizations and its capitalization would
impart a bias to the relevant coefficients. To reduce, but unfortunately not
eliminate, this possibility, explanatory variables are calculated either for the
year prior to that for which merger activity is measured, or, in the case of
balance sheet variables, at the beginning of the year for which merger activity
18 Empirical Testsis measured. More importantly, (1) and (2) are estimated using panel datasets
consisting of annual observations of large BHCs over two time periods: The
first, from 1998 to 2002, is designed to obtain the benefits of panel data
estimation using only the most recent (and relevant) five years of available
data. A second and longer period, from 1993 to 2002, is also used, since it
allows for more annual observations of merger activity and capitalization.
Reported estimations incorporate both year and BHC fixed effects. This
approach, in essence, controls for all BHC-specific characteristics that do not
vary over time and for all time-specific characteristics that do not vary across
BHCs. The inclusion of BHC fixed effects in particular eliminates potential
sources of spurious correlation that might arise in comparing one BHC with
another.
Spurious correlations in the form of endogeneity bias may result, however, if
a time varying unobserved variable influences both a BHC’s merger activity
and its level of capital (or excess capital) over time in a way different from its
effect on other BHCs in the sample. This type of correlation would exist, for
example, if BHCs intent on making acquisitions first increase capital levels.
The existence of such a correlation between merger activity and measures of
capital would bias upward estimates of the coefficients on measures of capital
(or excess regulatory capital), resulting in estimates that would overstate the
actual expected change in merger activity that would accompany a change in
capital requirements.
14
Test 2. The second test that we conduct should not be as vulnerable to
endogeneity bias but requires that we go back considerably in time to assess
the impact on merger activity of a previous change in capital requirements.
Specifically, we look at the effect on merger activity attributable to the
adoption of more restrictive capital standards in the United States. Passed into
law in December 1991 and fully implemented at the end of 1992, the “prompt
corrective action” (PCA) provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 1991, by all accounts, increased
capital adequacy requirements for commercial banks and made more certain
that failure to meet them would result in sanctions.
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14 Another example might be an improvement in a local economy that resulted in an increase
in both the merger activity and excess capital of BHCs located in the relevant area but that had no
or less influence on BHCs not located in the area. This would impart a positive bias to the
coefficients of the measures of excess capital in the regressions reported below. To control for this
possibility, we include a measure of local economic health in the analysis.In this second test, our strategy, roughly stated, is to examine the change in
merger activity exhibited by large BHCs before and after PCA provisions
became relevant. We restrict the sample to those BHCs that met the pre-PCA
capital requirements both before and after the PCA standards became
relevant. These conditions are imposed to determine whether BHCs that
became constrained only because of the new capital requirements (and not for
other reasons that may entail endogeneity bias) decreased their merger
activity by more (or increased it by less) than those BHCs that were not
constrained by the new requirements.
A positive answer to the question of whether constrained BHCs decreased
their acquisition activity relative to unconstrained BHCs would be consistent
with the hypothesis that “binding” or constraining capital requirements
reduce merger activity. More relevant to the question at hand, it would be
consistent with the hypothesis that relaxation of regulatory capital
requirements, to the extent that they are binding or constraining, would result
in an increase in merger activity.
A more formal derivation of the test is presented as follows: Suppose that
before the advent of PCA, the relationship between the merger activity of
a typical, large BHC and its capitalization can be expressed as:
Mi
b = β 0
b + β 1KADUM
b + β 2X
b + ε i
b , (3)
where the superscript “b” denotes that the variable or coefficient pertains to
the period before PCA, KADUM
b is a binary variable that receives the value
of one if capitalization was less than the level at which regulatory capital
requirements in that period became binding or constraining, and zero
otherwise, and ε i
b denotes the error term. The major feature of this
specification is that it allows a discrete difference in merger activity for BHCs
that do and do not face binding capital constraints.
We posit the same relationship after PCA, expressed as:
Mi
a = β 0
a + β 1 KADUM
a + β 2 X
a + ε i
a , (4)
where the superscript “a” refers to the period after adoption of PCAstandards,
with all variables defined as in (3).
Note that coefficients are presumed to be the same in (3) and (4), consistent
with the underlying “natural experiment” rationale for the test, which is that
20 Empirical Testsonly regulatory capital requirements, and not underlying relationships
between acquisition activity and explanatory variables changed between
periods. There appears to be little reason to expect changes in regulatory
minimums to affect these underlying relationships between merger activity
and its determinants. Importantly, KADUM
a is a binary variable that receives
the value of one if capitalization is less than the critical value of capitalization
under PCA. If this critical value is higher than that which was relevant in the
earlier period, then we will observe some BHCs for which KADUM
b=0 and
KADUM
a=1, despite little or no change in capitalization. In other words, there
will be some BHCs that were not constrained before the introduction of PCA
standards, but became constrained as a result of that introduction.
Subtracting (3) from (4) yields:
Mi
a –M i
b =( β 0
a – β 0
b)+β 1(KADUM
a– KADUM
b) + β 2(X
a –X
b)+( ε i
a – ε i
b), (5)
If determinants of merger activity other than those associated with a binding
capital requirement are either invariant over time, (in which case X
a =X
b) or,
as with variables reflecting the macroeconomic environment, the same across
BHCs over the time period, then the term β 2(X
a –X
b) in (5) is either zero or
subsumed into the constant term. Under these conditions, only β 1, KADUM
a,
and KADUM
b explain differences between the two groups of BHCs in the
change in merger activity before and after PCA. It follows that
(KADUM
a – KADUM
b)=1   for the case of a BHC that was not constrained by
capital requirements before PCAbut was constrained afterwards, and that the
term (KADUM
a – KADUM
b)=0   for BHCs that were not constrained in either
period.
If β 1<0, which is implied if constrained BHCs engage in less merger activity
than unconstrained ones, then we have the simple prediction that, of those
BHCs believed to be unconstrained by capital requirements prior to PCA
(KADUM
b = 0), the BHCs that became constrained after the change to
tougher capital standards (KADUM
a = 1) should have experienced a greater
reduction (or smaller increase) in merger activity than those BHCs that
remained unconstrained after the change (KADUM
a = 0). This prediction
follows because the only remaining term (except for the constant) in (5),
given these assumptions, is: β 1(KADUM
a – KADUM
b), and, with β 1<0, this
term is negative for banking organizations constrained by PCA and zero for
those that are not.
Empirical Tests 21Under the assumptions discussed above, this prediction may be tested with
a straightforward comparison of the change in merger activity across the two
groups. This test has the benefit of focusing on the effect of an actual past
change in capital standards, and it offers well known advantages associated
with this “difference in difference” methodology. Among these advantages,
all of the numerous differences in BHCs that might influence merger activity
and that do not change over the comparison period “cancel out.” Further,
because the changes in merger activity for the two groups are calculated for
the same time period, the effects of macroeconomic and other changes over
time (as long as they influence the two groups equally) are fully controlled
for. While these simplifying assumptions appear reasonable, tests based on
full estimations of (5) are also conducted.
22 Empirical TestsIV. Samples, Data, and Key Variables
Samples employed in the analysis consist of the largest U.S. BHCs (based on
total assets as of mid-year 2003) that operated throughout the period under
investigation. Two successively larger samples of BHCs that operated
between year-end 1991 and mid-year 2003 are used in test 1 (panel data
analysis). The more restrictive sample includes the ten U.S. banking
organizations that are expected to be required to adopt A-IRB status under the
current proposals. These organizations are referred to as the mandatory
A-IRB BHCs. The first sample also includes the nine other U.S. BHCs with
total assets of at least $50 billion as of mid-year 2003, since they are
considered most likely to adopt voluntarily the A-IRB approach in the initial
implementation phase. The second and larger sample includes the ten
mandatory A-IRB BHCs plus all other U.S. BHCs with total assets of at least
$15 billion as of mid-year 2003. This results in a sample of 38 BHCs and
includes a large number of banking organizations that are likely to eventually
adopt A-IRB. Analysis is conducted on both samples over two different time
periods: a shorter and more recent one covering the years 1998–2002 and
a longer one covering the years 1993–2002.
The samples used in test 2 (the natural experiment) are the same as those used
in test 1, except that BHCs must have operated between year-end 1986 and
mid-year 2003. This requirement causes two BHCs to be dropped because
they were not operating during the early part of the period. For reasons
discussed below, the years 1987 to 1989 serve as the pre-PCA period, while
1991 and 1992 serve as the post-PCA period.
Merger data were obtained from two sources. The SNL Financial Bank
Mergers and Acquisitions Database was the primary source for data on deals
that were completed after December 31, 1989. The SNLdatabase includes the
vast majority of acquisitions of banks (banks and bank holding companies)
and thrifts (savings banks, savings and loan associations, and thrift holding
companies) that took place during the period, which includes all of the time
covered by test 1 (panel study) and the latter part of test 2 (natural
experiment).
The SNL database is not used before 1990 because it is not very
comprehensive for deals that took place during that time. Therefore, data for
this earlier period were collected from another source. Mergers that took
23place in 1987, 1988, or 1989 – the pre-PCA years needed for test 2 – were
identified from a database created by staff at the Federal Reserve Board from
Federal Reserve Bulletins and reports provided by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
(OCC)
15 This database includes only acquisitions in which each party was
either a commercial bank or a BHC that operated a commercial bank. Deals
involving a thrift as the acquirer or target were not included. Therefore, to
maintain consistency, mergers involving savings banks or savings and loan
associations that took place after the adoption of PCA are dropped from the
group of mergers identified on the SNL database. This requirement has little
effect on the set of mergers included in the analysis.
We  construct two variables that measure merger activity. The first is the
annual number of mergers completed during the relevant period by a BHC.
This variable measures the frequency with which a BHC pursued
consolidation, not the size of acquisitions. It can be constructed for all years
in our analysis and therefore is used for both test 1 and test 2.
A second merger variable that incorporates the size of the targets acquired by
a BHC is also used for test 1. Data on the amount of banking assets acquired
are available for all years included in test 1 and are used to construct
a measure of the relative magnitude of acquisition activity that was conducted
by each BHC in the sample. Specifically, the aggregate amount of banking
assets acquired in a given year is divided by the BHC’s asset level at the start
of the year. By dividing by the BHC’s total assets, we account for the size of
that banking organization.
Capital ratios are constructed with data from the Y-9C report, which is filed
quarterly by each BHC with the Federal Reserve Board and contains
extensive accounting information on the organization. Creating variables that
measure the extent to which BHCs faced capital constraints involves several
challenges. First, during the full time period for which data are required
(1986–2002), two distinct sets of capital requirements were in effect.
Therefore, the capital ratios that are constructed must be those that were
relevant at the time.
Capital requirements during the late-1980s predated the implementation of
Basel I and its associated risk-based capital rules. At the time, BHCs had to
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15 This database was the primary source for two extensive studies of bank merger activity in
the United States. See Rhoades (2000) and Rhoades (1996).satisfy two requirements. First, the ratio of primary capital to assets had to be
at least 5.5 percent and the ratio of total capital to assets had to be at least
6 percent.
16 We  create variables that measure both the primary and total
capital ratios that are consistent with these regulatory requirements.
The original Basel capital accord, or Basel I, was approved in 1988 and fully
implemented by 1992. This accord established a new set of capital
requirements that attempted to take risk into account. More specifically, less
capital had to be held against assets that were considered safer, such as
residential mortgages and inter-bank loans, as well as government and agency
securities. In the United States, BHCs had to satisfy two risk-based capital
requirements and one leverage requirement. The ratio of tier 1 capital to
risk-weighted assets had to be at least 4 percent, the ratio of total capital to
risk-weighted assets had to be at least 8 percent, and tier 1 capital to average
tangible assets had to be at least 4 percent. For each year that the Basel
I requirements were in effect, we construct variables that correspond to each
of these three capital ratios.
Legal limits represent the lowest level of capital that a BHC can maintain
before violating regulatory requirements. However, as mentioned, BHCs are
likely to prefer to hold a capital buffer above those regulatory limits for
a variety of reasons. First, there are tangible benefits to being considered well
or strongly capitalized. During the 1990s, the implementation of PCA
standards meant that banks that maintained capital ratios below certain
thresholds faced increased regulatory intervention despite the fact that their
capital ratios exceeded regulatory minimums. Although PCA does not
directly apply to BHCs, it is relevant, because it applies to their bank
subsidiaries. To be considered well-capitalized under the requirements of
PCA, a bank must have a ratio of tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets of at
least 6 percent, a ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets of at least
10 percent, and tier 1 capital to average tangible assets of at least 5 percent.
In the late 1980s, prior to Basel I rules, the Federal Reserve Board had
established that 7 percent was an important level for the total capital ratio.
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16 Primary capital for a bank holding company consists of common stock, perpetual preferred
stock, surplus (excluding surplus relating to limited-life perpetual stock), undivided profits,
contingency and other capital reserves, mandatory convertible instruments, allowance for possible
loan and lease losses (exclusive of allocated transfer risk reserves), minority interest in equity
accounts of consolidated subsidiaries, and perpetual debt instruments. Total capital consists of
primary and secondary capital. This latter component includes limited-life preferred stock, as well
as bank subordinated notes and debentures and unsecured long-term debt of the parent company
and its non-bank subsidiaries.BHCs with total capital that exceeded 7 percent of assets were considered
adequately capitalized and faced less intense monitoring and a lower
likelihood of supervisory actions than BHCs with ratios below 7 percent, but
above 6 percent, the required minimum.
Another reason that BHCs may want to hold capital above Basel I or even the
PCA regulatory limits is for protection against downturns in the business
cycle and unanticipated events. Additional capital may also be desirable
because it would provide BHCs with flexibility that could be used to pursue
potentially profitable opportunities such as acquisitions or other types of
expansion. Moreover, a buffer may be desirable so that losses do not restrict
the BHC’s ability to engage in certain businesses. Of course, still another
reason that BHCs may maintain capital ratios that exceed regulatory
minimums is that the level of capital dictated by the market may exceed the
level that would be held because of regulatory requirements.
To  make the relationship between excess regulatory capital and merger
activity more explicit, measures of BHC capitalization are expressed in terms
of excess regulatory capital, which is calculated as actual capital ratios less
some critical level based on regulatory requirements or standards. The critical
levels chosen for this purpose will be those that must be exceeded to be
considered strongly capitalized. More specifically, we use the three ratios
required for a bank to be considered-well capitalized under PCA(tier 1 capital
to risk-weighted assets of 6 percent, total capital to risk-weighted assets of
10 percent, and tier 1 capital to average tangible assets of 5 percent) for
analysis of the years since 1990 and the total capital ratio level (7 percent of
assets) required to avoid additional scrutiny in the late 1980s. Although no
level for a strong level of the primary capital ratio was defined by the
regulator prior to 1991, we use 6.5 percent (the regulatory minimum of
5.5 percent plus 1 percentage point) as an estimate for a primary capital ratio
that would be considered a sign of a strong BHC. Table 1 presents a summary
of the various capital ratios, requirements, and variables that are relevant for
different time periods.
For each BHC, we construct a variable that measures the overall constraint
faced by the BHC by taking the minimum of all the measures of excess
regulatory capital that were relevant during the year. Because BHCs must
satisfy all the capital requirements in effect at a given time, the ratio that
reflects the weakest, or most binding, actual capital position is the one that is
likely to be most relevant for the BHC. We recognize that simply taking the
lowest value is imprecise. For example, ratios are based on different
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believe that the magnitude of the smallest excess capital measure provides
a reasonable proxy for the extent of capital constraints faced by a BHC. For
test 1, we measure excess capital at the beginning of each year under
investigation (1993–2002 or 1998–2002), and for test 2, we measure it at the
beginning of 1987 for the pre-PCA period and at the beginning of 1991 for
the post-PCA period.
In short, we take the smallest difference between each of the capital ratios
from among the relevant set of regulatory ratios and the value required to be
considered strongly capitalized. While not adjusted for individual levels of
BHC risk and risk tolerance or for idiosyncratic needs to meet capital
requirements, we nonetheless believe that our measure of excess regulatory
capital roughly captures the degree to which a BHC faced regulatory capital
constraints.
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The two tests that we conduct provide a thorough and rigorous examination
of the question of whether changes in regulatory capital requirements might
be expected to influence merger activity.
Test 1. In the first type of test conducted, we estimate, for two different
samples of BHCs and for two different time periods, the relationship between
a BHC’s merger activity and its excess capital, defined as the minimum of the
difference between each of three actual capital ratio measures and that level
of those ratios required to be considered strongly capitalized. Table 2 provides
definitions of the independent variables used in these estimations.
Because many of the BHCs in the sample made no acquisitions during at least
some of the years in which they are observed, each of the two dependent
variables used to measure annual merger activity (the number of acquisitions
and the ratio of banking assets acquired to the assets of the acquirer) receive
the value of zero for many observations. Because of the well-known violation
of OLS assumptions that this entails, other estimation procedures must be
used. Since the number of annual acquisitions made by a BHC is a count of
the number of occurrences of an event, we use negative binomial
maximum-likelihood regression when this variable is employed to measure
merger activity.
17 Since the ratio of acquired banking assets to the assets of the
acquirer may be thought of as a continuous variable that is censored at zero,
we use Tobit maximum-likelihood regressions when this variable is employed
to measure merger activity.
Each reported regression includes as an explanatory variable the
BHC’s expense ratio (expense ratio), calculated for the previous year as total
noninterest expenses divided by the sum of total noninterest income and net
interest income. This rough, but widely used, measure of a BHC’s efficiency
is included as an explanatory variable because it is often asserted that greater
efficiency is associated with greater acquisition activity, as more efficient
firms frequently acquire less efficient ones.
18 A negative and significant
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17 Because assumptions underlying the more common Poisson maximum-likelihood
regressions could be rejected, this more general estimation procedure was chosen. See chapter 19
of Wooldridge (2002) for an extensive discussion on these regression models.
18 Akhavein, Berger, and Humphrey (1997) and Vander Vennet (1996) report evidence
consistent with this.coefficient on this variable would be consistent with this hypothesis, because
more efficient firms have lower values of this expense ratio.
To account for differences in the economic conditions in which BHCs in the
sample operate, we employ the annual change in housing prices, collected
from a weighted repeat sales index (the House Price Index) produced by the
Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight. Price changes are measured
at the state level and over the same year as merger activity. For BHCs with
banking assets in more than one state, a weighted average of these
state-specific measures is used, with each state’s share of the BHC’s total
deposits used as the weights.
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For each type of estimation, results using two different functional forms are
presented, conforming to specifications (1) and (2) above. The first employs
as an explanatory variable excregcap, which is a continuous measure of
excess regulatory capital, measured, as described above, as the minimum
difference between each of the three observed capital ratios and that level of
each ratio required to be considered well capitalized under PCA. The second
replaces this variable with two binary variables indicating different ranges of
excregcap observed for the BHC. The variable excregcap(1–2) indicates that
the BHC’s excess regulatory capital, measured as described above, is between
1 percentage point and 2 percentage points, while excregcap(>2) is similarly
defined for BHCs that have excess regulatory capital of at least 2 percentage
points. BHC and year combinations in which the minimum capital differential
is less than 1 percentage point represent the omitted category.
Tables 3 and 4 report regression results obtained for the 1998–2002 period,
and tables 5 and 6 report the results of equivalent estimations conducted for
the longer 1993–2002 period. All reported regressions include year fixed
effects (reported only in tables 3 and 4 for reasons of space) and BHC fixed
effects (not reported in any tables for reasons of space). Tables 3 through 6
each presents four different estimations, organized into two pairs. The first
pair reports the results of negative binomial maximum-likelihood regressions
when the number of acquisitions serves as the dependent variable, while the
second pair present the results of Tobit maximum-likelihood regressions
when the ratio of acquired banking assets to assets of the acquirer serves as
the dependent variable.
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19 We also account for local economic conditions by including a variable that measures the
average unemployment rate in the state or states in which a BHC operates. Results (not reported)
using this variable are the same as those obtained using the annual change in housing prices.Consider first table 3, which presents results obtained for the period
1998–2002 for a sample consisting of the ten mandatory A-IRB BHCs and the
nine other BHCs with total assets of at least $50 billion as of mid-year 2003.
This sample may be the most immediately relevant to the Basel II proposal,
since it is composed specifically of those BHCs whose regulatory capital
requirements would be the most likely to be directly affected by the proposal.
Of the nineteen BHCs in this group, four are excluded from these estimations
because they made no acquisitions during the period.
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The finding of positive and statistically significant coefficients on the
measures of excess regulatory capital would be consistent with the hypothesis
that greater excess regulatory capital enabled or induced BHCs to increase
acquisition activity. However, the coefficients reported in 3 are not
statistically significant. Indeed the coefficients on excregcap, the continuous
measure of excess regulatory capital, are negative and insignificant. The
coefficients on the binary variable excregcap(1–2) are positive when either
the number of mergers or the ratio of assets acquired to total assets is used to
measure merger activity, and the coefficient on excregcap(>2) is positive
when the ratios of assets acquired to total assets is used, but these coefficients
are also not statistically significant, both individually and jointly, with either
measure of merger activity.
The coefficients on expratio are negative, consistent with the hypothesis that
less efficient BHCs (i.e., those with higher expense ratios) are less likely to
acquire other banking organizations, but they are not statistically significant.
The coefficients on hpchange, the change in housing prices during the year,
are positive, as might be expected if a better state economy is associated with
a greater tendency for BHCs to acquire other banking institutions, but they are
also not statistically significant. The coefficients on the year binary variables
are negative and, in most cases, statistically significant, reflecting the fact that
1998, the year representing the omitted category, saw a greater amount of
merger activity than later years in the period.
Our inability to find a statistically significant relationship between merger
activity and excess regulatory capital may reflect the possibility that the level
of capitalization required by the market is, for the most part, greater than that
required by regulation, with no relationship between regulatory requirements
and merger activity the result. However, this lack of statistical significance
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20 These observations are dropped, because the fixed-effects statistical model that is used in
the empirical analysis requires that, for a given BHC, acquisition activity exhibit some variation
over time.may also reflect the small size of the sample, chosen to contain only those
BHCs that are the most likely to be required to adopt or the most likely to
adopt voluntarily the A-IRB approach.
Table 4 reports the results of the same regressions, run on a larger sample
obtained by lowering the size threshold from $50 billion to $15 billion in total
consolidated assets as of mid-year 2003. The result is an increase in the
number of BHCs in the analysis from 15 to 33 and an increase in the number
of year-BHC observations from 75 to 165. For this larger sample, the
coefficients on all measures of excess regulatory capital are positive,
consistent with the hypothesis that excess regulatory capital induces or
enables BHCs to engage in more acquisition activity, but again, none are
statistically significant. The estimated coefficients on excregcap(1–2) and
excregcap (>2) are jointly insignificant as well.
The coefficients on expense ratio are negative, consistent with the hypothesis
that less efficient banking organizations exhibit less of a tendency to acquire
other organizations, and these coefficients are highly significant when the
ratio of assets acquired to total assets is used as the measure of merger
activity. The coefficients on hpchange are not statistically significant, while
the coefficients of the year binary variables are all negative and, in most
cases, highly significant, reflecting the general decline in merger activity
occurring after 1998. 
Tables 5 and 6 report estimates for regressions equivalent to those reported in
tables 3 and 4, except that they employ panel data sets that extend from 1993
to 2002 instead of from 1998 to 2002.
21 Table 5 reports these results for
a sample consisting only of BHCs with greater than $50 billion in
consolidated assets (which includes all mandatory A-IRB BHCs). Again, all
coefficients on variables that measure the degree of excess regulatory capital
are positive, but not statistically significant. The coefficients on the two
binary excess capital variables are also jointly insignificant. 
The coefficients on expratio are all negative and, for this sample, highly
significant in every case, consistent with the hypothesis that more efficient
banking organizations exhibit a greater tendency to acquire other banking
organizations. The coefficients on hpchange are not statistically significant.
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21 Note that the samples analyzed over the 1993-2002 period contain more BHCs than the
samples analyzed over the shorter 1998-2002 period, because, for this longer panel, fewer BHCs
were omitted as a result of making no acquisitions during the period. Only two BHCs made no
acquisitions between 1993 and 2002.Year fixed effects in the case of this longer panel are not shown for reasons of
space.
Table 6 reports the results of equivalent regressions when the sample is
expanded to include BHCs with greater than $15 billion in consolidated assets
as of mid-year 2003. 
Because of the many years and BHCs included as observations, this sample
is the largest of those for which results are reported, and here, we do find
statistically significant positive coefficients on the measures of excess
regulatory capital when the number of mergers is the measure of merger
activity, but not when the ratio of acquired assets to total assets is used as the
measure. In this latter case, the coefficients on the binary capital variables are
not jointly significant either. Also in the case of this sample, the coefficients
on expense ratio are negative and statistically significant in most cases, while
the coefficients on hpchange are not significant.
Summarizing the results reported in tables 3 through 6, we find that
coefficients on measures of excess regulatory capital are generally positive,
consistent with the hypothesis that excess regulatory capital induces or
enables BHCs to increase their level of merger activity, but in most cases are
statistically insignificant. Indeed, such coefficients are statistically significant
only when the largest sample is employed, and then only for the case in which
merger activity is measured by the number of annual acquisitions.
Despite these generally weak regression results, it is still possible that the
relationship between excess regulatory capital and BHC merger activity is
quantitatively important, based on the magnitude of estimated coefficients. To
address this issue, we estimate the likely range of the quantitative impact of
adoption of the A-IRB approach on merger activity by combining coefficient
estimates with estimates of changes in excess regulatory capital that might
result from adoption of A-IRB.
The Third Quantitative Impact Study (QIS 3) was conducted by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision to understand the possible effects that the
Basel II proposals (as of late 2002) might have on capital levels across
participating banks.
22 Based on data for 22 U.S. BHCs, the QIS 3 estimated
that adoption of A-IRB would, by reducing certain risk weights, lead to an
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22 The evolution of the Basel proposal, of course, implies that the QIS 3 may not be a good
indicator of the effect of the present proposal. Another quantitative impact study is underway and
is expected to be completed in 2005.average reduction in total risk-weighted assets (RWA) of 6 percent. This
change would have the effect of raising the ratios of tier 1 to RWA and total
capital to RWA. A change in RWA has no effect on the leverage ratio (total
capital to average tangible assets), because the denominator is not based on
RWA.
We  calculate the three relevant regulatory capital ratios – tier 1 capital to
RWA, total capital to RWA, and tier 1 capital to average tangible assets – for
each of the 38 BHCs in the sample using data from June 30, 2003. We also
estimate the value of those ratios under the A-IRB approach by assuming that
RWA would be 6 percent lower than the level reported as of that date. Then,
for both sets of the three ratios, we compute the difference between each of
the ratios and the minimum needed to be considered well capitalized under
PCAstandards (see table 1). Next, for both the standard and A-IRB approach,
we take the minimum of the three differences. Finally, we subtract the excess
capital figure computed under current capital rules from the excess capital
figure obtained under the A-IRB approach to get an estimate of the change in
excess regulatory capital (expressed as a ratio) that a BHC would experience
with the adoption of the A-IRB approach. It should be noted that this final
figure will be 0 if the BHC were constrained by the leverage ratio under both
capital approaches, since the leverage ratio would be unaffected by adoption
of A-IRB.
On average, we find (using QIS 3 results) that adoption of A-IRB would result
in an increase in a BHC’s excess regulatory capital (expressed as a ratio) of
0.31 percentage points. However, it should be noted that this estimate
assumes that every BHC in the sample experienced an identical change in
risk-weighted assets equal to the average. In actuality, however, the change in
risk-weighted assets following adoption of A-IRB should vary across BHCs.
Although not accounting for this variation should affect our estimates of the
change in excess regulatory capital, the results of the exercise should not be
substantially influenced, because we are estimating the likely range of
changes in merger activity, which is rather general.
In order to assess the economic meaning of an increase in excess regulatory
capital of 0.31 percentage points, we employ the regression coefficient on
excregcap, as well as previous levels of BHC merger activity.
23 Calculations
of the range of likely changes in acquisition activity are based on the smallest
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23 We do not examine the change in merger activity implied by coefficients on excregcap(1-2)
and  excregcap(>2) because we estimate that the values of these binary variables following
adoption of A-IRB would change for very few BHCs in our sample.and largest estimated coefficients on excregcap, because they generate the
most extreme changes in merger activity that can be predicted from regression
results.
The largest coefficient estimated for the number of deals is 0.19 (table 4), and
it implies that the average number of mergers conducted by a BHC would
increase by 6.1 percent, given an increase in excess regulatory capital of 0.31
percentage points.
24 The smallest coefficient estimate is – 0.087 (table 3) and
it corresponds to a decrease in the number of acquisitions of 2.7 percent.
These percent increases translate into very modest projected changes in
merger activity. The average BHC in the full sample of 38 banks conducted
1.74 deals per year between 1993 and 2002, which is greater than the
1998–2002 average for the full sample or any of the averages for the smaller
sample of very large BHCs. Given this average number of deals, a 6.1 percent
increase would mean an increase in the average annual number of mergers of
only 0.1 acquisitions per large BHC, and a 2.7 percent decrease would mean
0.05 fewer acquisitions per year for each large BHC.
With respect to the ratio of acquired banking assets to total BHC assets, the
largest coefficient is 0.049 (table 4) and the smallest one is – 0.022 (table 3).
Respectively, these estimates imply changes in the average value of acquired
assets to acquirer assets of 1.5 percentage points and – 0.7 percentage points
following a 0.31 percentage point jump in excess regulatory capital.
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Several caveats suggest that these estimated changes in BHC merger activity
that would follow adoption of the A-IRB approach should be viewed as
rough, back-of-the-envelope calculations. First, the analysis is static and does
not take into account the effect of portfolio changes that could accompany
adoption. If BHCs increase the relative share of their assets held in categories
that would receive lower risk weights, then the increase in excess regulatory
capital could be greater than the estimate of 0.31 percentage points. Second,
the data used to estimate changes in RWAare based on QIS 3, which analyzed
the effect of the Basel II proposal that was current at the time of the study (late
2002/early 2003). The regulatory capital rules that are ultimately adopted are
likely to differ from those used in QIS 3. Finally, we have noted that the
estimated change in excess regulatory capital incorporated in this analysis is
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24 For the negative binomial regression, the percentage increase in the number of mergers for
a given change in excess capital (∆ excregcap) can be computed as (100× e
(β )(∆ excregcap)– 100), which
in this case equals 100× e
(0.19)(0.31)– 100.
25 The percentage point increase in the ratio of acquired assets to acquirer assets for a given
change in excess capital (∆ excregcap) can be computed simply as 100×β×∆ excregcap.based on the average change in risk-weighted assets and does not take into
account the wide range of possible changes that individual BHCs may
experience.
In summary, our estimates suggest that the likely change in the number of
acquisitions in the United States that would follow adoption of the A-IRB
capital approach would fall within a narrow range, and that the number of
acquisitions would be unlikely to change much following adoption. This
result is especially notable because the only significant results obtained in test
1 are for the case in which acquisition activity is measured by the number of
deals. Estimates of the change in the ratio of acquired assets to BHC assets
includes more extreme values and the likely range is therefore larger.
However, all of these estimates are based on statistically insignificant
coefficients.
Test 2. Tables 7 and 8 present the results of t-tests that analyze the effect on
merger activity of generally tighter capital requirements brought about by the
adoption of PCAcapital standards. In these two tables, merger activity before
PCAis measured as the average number of mergers per year during the period
1987–1989. Merger activity after the time that the requirements of PCA
should have been foreseen, assumed to be the beginning of 1991, is measured
as the average number of mergers per year for the period 1991–1992.
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Only BHCs judged to be relatively unconstrained by the capital requirements
in effect prior to the advent of PCA (the “old standards”) are included in the
comparisons. Such BHCs are defined as those that met the requirement for
being “strongly capitalized” (primary capital ratio of at least 6.5 percent and
total capital ratio of at least 7 percent) as of December 31, 1986, the start of
our pre-PCA period. In addition, we require that the primary capital and total
capital ratios of sample BHCs as of December 31, 1990, the start of our
post-PCA period, also exceed 6.5 percent and 7 percent, respectively.
Requiring sample BHCs to be well-capitalized under the “old standards” at
the start of both periods increases the likelihood that the change in acquisition
activity undertaken by a BHC over the analysis period is affected largely by
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26 Although PCA was enacted in December 1991 and fully implemented at the end of 1992,
we believe that 1991–92, which took place before PCAbecame legally binding, is the appropriate
period to use as the time that PCA standards first became relevant. The data show that in 1991
sample BHCs with less excess regulatory capital, as measured with the ratios relevant under PCA,
increased their excess regulatory capital by more than sample BHCs with greater excess regulatory
capital measured with those ratios. This behavior suggests that the standards that would become
legally effective at the end of 1992 were already affecting BHCs in 1991. Nonetheless, the results
of the analysis are similar if 1992–93 is used as the post-PCA period.the new PCA standards, and is not heavily influenced by any underlying
weakness in the BHC’s capital position that would have affected merger
activity even if standards had not been increased.
BHCs are split into two groups – those that became constrained by the “new
standards” introduced by PCA and those that remained unconstrained under
these standards. In the post-PCA period, a BHC is classified as constrained if
it fails to meet any of the requirements for being well capitalized under PCA
(see table 1) as of December 31, 1990. BHCs that meet all three of these
requirements are counted as unconstrained after the change to the new capital
regime. Clearly, other definitions of what constitutes a binding capital
constraint are possible, and we discuss below the results of tests that employ
alternative definitions.
Table 7 reports the results of this test for the sample of sixteen mandatory
A-IRB BHCs and other BHCs with consolidated assets greater than $50
billion (as of mid-year 2003) that met the definition of being unconstrained
under the “old standards” as of year-end 1986 and year-end 1990. The first
row indicates that for those BHCs that became constrained by PCA capital
standards (nine BHCs), mergers per year declined from an average of 1.63
during the period 1987–1989 to .61 during the 1991–1992 period. The second
row indicates that for the group of BHCs judged not to have become
constrained by PCA standards (seven BHCs), mergers actually increased
slightly, from 1.33 per year during the 1987–1989 period to 1.50 per year in
the period 1991–1992. Perhaps the most relevant number reported in table 7
is the “difference in difference” reported in the third column of the third row.
This figure shows that BHCs that became constrained participated in 1.19
fewer mergers per year, on average, than would have been the case had they
not become constrained, assuming their merger activity changed after the
introduction of PCA in the same way as the group that remained
unconstrained. Although the difference between the two groups of BHCs is
clearly consistent with the hypothesis that the imposition of binding capital
requirements would cause merger activity to decline, the t-statistic calculated
for this difference, and reported in the third column of the fourth row, is only
– 1.46, indicating that this difference is not statistically significant at levels
traditionally employed to reject null hypotheses (in this case that there is no
difference between the two groups).
Table 8 reports the results of an equivalent test conducted using a larger
sample obtained by including those BHCs that had at least $15 billion in
consolidated assets as of mid-year 2003. In this sample, those BHCs that
Results 37became constrained by the requirements of PCA (eleven BHCs) reduced the
number of acquisitions that they made annually from 1.48 in the period
1987–1989 to .54 in the 1991–1992 period. The seventeen BHCs in the
sample that did not become constrained by the requirements of the new
capital standard also exhibited a reduction in average annual acquisitions,
from 1.08 in the earlier period to .76 in the later period. The “difference in
difference” of –.63 indicates that BHCs that became constrained by PCA
participated, on average, in .63 fewer mergers per year than would have been
the case had they exhibited the same change as did those BHCs that did not
become constrained. The t-statistic of – 1.18 registered for this difference
indicates that for this sample as well, this difference is not statistically
significant.
The results obtained in test 2 appear to be robust, as we conducted a number
of alternative analyses and obtained consistent findings. The results of these
additional analyses are discussed, but not reported. Results obtained using
higher standards to differentiate whether a BHC is classified as capital
constrained or not under the new PCA standards indicate no significant
differences in the change in merger activity of the two groups of BHCs. In one
of these alternative tests, we classified a BHC as constrained if any of its
relevant capital ratios were less than the PCA standard plus 0.5 percentage
points, and in another alternative, we used the PCA standard plus
1 percentage point to distinguish between constrained and unconstrained
BHCs. Results were similar to those reported in tables 7 and 8, which present
results based on PCAstandards (with no additional cushion) as the level used
to classify BHCs.
We also conducted analyses on an expanded sample of 54 BHCs that operated
between December 31, 1986 and December 31, 1993 and that held assets of
at least $5 billion as of December 31, 1986. Of these organizations, 45 were
unconstrained under the “old standards.” Results based on this group also fail
to reject the hypothesis of no difference in the change in acquisition activity
between those BHCs that became constrained by PCA standards and those
that did not. Further, regression analyses that control for other variables that
might influence the observed change in a BHC’s merger activity, as derived
in (5) above, were conducted and found to yield similar, statistically
insignificant results. Finally, as noted (see footnote 22), results are similar
when the post-PCAperiod is defined as 1992 and 1993, although more BHCs
are unconstrained by PCA standards in this later period.
38 ResultsVI. Summary and Conclusion
This paper examines empirically the question of whether the internal
ratings-based (IRB) approaches employed by certain large banking
organizations to determine their regulatory capital requirements, as provided
for in the proposed Basel II capital accord, would be likely to lead those
banking organizations to increase their acquisition activity. Although the
empirical analysis in this study focuses on the United States, where the
advanced IRB approach will be implemented by a relatively small number
of large banking organizations, the results and discussion are relevant for any
country that permits banking organizations to use any internal ratings-based
approach to determine capital requirements.
Concerns that acquisition activity would increase following adoption of IRB
by a relatively small number of banking organizations stem from two
consequences of using an IRB approach. Arguments based on these
consequences can be usefully designated as “excess regulatory capital” and
“relative capital advantage” arguments. “Excess regulatory capital”
arguments focus on the additional excess regulatory capital that would result
from a reduction in an IRB adopter’s capital requirements as the driver of
greater acquisition activity. Arguments based on the “relative capital
advantage” cite the disparity in capital requirements that would exist between
banking organizations using the IRB approach and those that would not as the
force fueling merger activity. 
Because we cannot examine the effects of past reductions in capital
requirements in the United States, which is the focus of this study, that affect
some organizations but not others, we conduct two less definitive, but
nonetheless informative, tests. The first uses recent data to determine whether
large banking organizations in the United States with greater excess
regulatory capital exhibited a greater tendency to subsequently acquire other
banking organizations. The second examines whether the generally higher
capital requirements resulting from adoption of “prompt corrective action”
standards in the United States in the early 1990s (the last time capital
requirements were substantially changed) resulted in a relative reduction in
merger activity on the part of those large banking organizations most severely
affected by the policy.
39Both of these tests are most relevant to “excess regulatory capital” arguments
for increased acquisition activity. Of relevance to “relative capital advantage”
arguments, however, we note that a substantial number of studies do not
support a major implication of the arguments.
On the whole, we do not find convincing evidence either that past changes in
excess regulatory capital or that past changes in capital standards had
substantial effects on merger activity in the United States. Estimated
coefficients and observed differences have signs consistent with the concern
that a reduction in regulatory capital requirements for large banking
organizations would result in increased merger activity on their part.
However, results of the two tests are, with a few exceptions, statistically
insignificant, and, in cases where results are statistically significant,
quantitative magnitudes are small. Overall, we do not find strong evidence
that adoption of IRB under Basel II will lead to a substantial increase in
merger activity.
40 Summary and ConclusionAppendix
Table 1
Capital Measures for U.S. banks
* The ratios of primary capital to total assets and total capital to total assets are also computed for 1990
in order to identify bank holding companies that were affected by the advent of prompt corrective action
standards, but that did not experience a substantial weakening in capitalization under the standards
relevant before prompt corrective action.
Relevant Regulatory Minimum for Source of definition for
years minimum „strongly“ „strongly“ capitalized
capitalized
Primary capital 1987–1989 5.5 % 6.5 % Same mark-up that is 
to total assets* used with total capital
Total capital 1987–1989 6.0 % 7.0 % Top total capital zone
to total assets* established in Federal
Reserve System regulations
Tier 1 capital to 1990–2002 4.0 % 6.0 % Prompt corrective 
risk-weighted assets action standards
Total capital to 1990–2002 8.0 % 10.0 % Prompt corrective 
risk-weighted assets action standards
Tier 1 capital 1990–2002 4.0 % 5.0 % Prompt corrective 




excregcap The “excess capital” exhibited by the BHC at the beginning of the year for
which merger activity is observed. Since, for the periods examined,
specified values of three different types of capital ratios had to be exceeded
to be considered well capitalized, this variable measures the smallest of the
differences between the observed BHC’s capital ratio and that level
required to be considered well capitalized under prompt corrective action. 
excregcap(1–2) A binary variable indicating that excregcap is between 1 and 2 percentage
points above the regulatory minimum required to be considered well
capitalized.
excregcap(>2) A binary variable indicating that excregcap is 2 or more percentage points
above the regulatory minimum to be considered well capitalized.
expense ratio The “expense ratio” exhibited by the BHC during the year previous to the
year for which merger activity is observed, defined as BHC noninterest
expenses, divided by the sum of noninterest income and the difference
between interest income and interest expenses.
hpchange Weighted average of the percent change in housing prices in the states in
which each BHC operates, with BHC-specific state deposit shares used to
calculate the weights.
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses. . +, *, and ** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively. Four of nineteen BHCs are omitted from the analysis because they made no
acquisitions during the time period.
The Relationship Between Merger Activity and “Excess Regulatory Capital” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U. S. BHCs with Assets over $50 Billion as of
June 30, 2003, Panel Data Estimation for the Period 1998–2002, with Year and BHC
Fixed Effects
Dependent variable Number of Number of Ratio of Assets Ratio of Assets
Mergers Mergers Acquired to Acquired to
Total Assets Total Assets
excregcap –.087 –.022
(–.23) (–.24)
excregcap (1–2) .31 .10
(.80) (1.03)
excregcap (>2) .13 –.025
(.16) (–.13)
expense ratio –.039 –.036 –.018 –.017
(–1.03) (–.94) (–1.67) (–1.53)
hpchange .082 .10 .017 .021
(.58) (.71) (.37) (.46)
Year 1999 –.44 –.33 –.35** –.35**
(–.98) (–.69) (–2.68) (–2.70)
Year 2000 –.87 –.75 –.48** –.47**
(–1.52) (–1.31) (–2.68) (–2.79)
Year 2001 –1.05+ –.92+ –.33+ –.33+
(–1.77) (–1.64) (–1.93) (–1.95)
Year 2002 –1.52* –1.45* –.47** –.47**
(–2.57) (–2.46) (–2.75) (–2.79)
Estimation procedure: Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial Tobit Tobit
regression regression regression regression
no. of obs. 75 75 75 75
no. of BHCs 15 15 15 15
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses. . +, *, and ** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively. Five of thirty-eight BHCs are omitted from the analysis because they made no
acquisitions during the time period.
The Relationship Between Merger Activity and “Excess Regulatory Capital” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U. S. BHCs with Assets over $15 Billion as of
June 30, 2003, Panel Data Estimation for the Period 1998–2002, with Year and BHC
Fixed Effects
Dependent variable Number of Number of Ratio of Assets Ratio of Assets
Mergers Mergers Acquired to Acquired to
Total Assets Total Assets
excregcap .19 .049
(.99) (1.09)
excregcap (1–2) .31 .069
(1.17) (.95)
excregcap (>2) .42 .095
(1.03) (.89)
expense ratio –.026 –.031 –.016** –.017**
(–1.13) (–1.32) (–2.68) (–2.75)
hpchange .089 .10 –.034 –.033
(1.04) (1.20) (–1.26) (–1.23)
Year 1999 –.65* –.62* –.18* –.18*
(–2.46) (–2.28) (–2.31) (–2.30)
Year 2000 –1.06** –1.12** –.16 –.17
(–2.95) (–3.26) (–1.52) (–1.61)
Year 2001 –1.20** –1.25** –.15 –.17
(–3.06) (–3.36) (–1.37) (–1.52)
Year 2002 –1.63** –1.66** –.31** –.32**
(–4.46) (–4.69) (–3.10) (–3.22)
Estimation procedure: Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial Tobit Tobit
regression regression regression regression
no. of obs. 165 165 165 165
no. of BHCs 33 33 33 33
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses. . +, *, and ** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively. Two of nineteen BHCs are omitted from the analysis because they made no
acquisitions during the time period.
The Relationship Between Merger Activity and “Excess Regulatory Capital” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U. S. BHCs with more than $50 Billion in Assets
as of June 30, 2003, Panel Data Estimation for the Period 1993–2002, with Year
and BHC Fixed Effects
Dependent variable Number of Number of Ratio of Assets Ratio of Assets
Mergers Mergers Acquired to Acquired to
Total Assets Total Assets
excregcap .035 .021
(0.24) (.54)
excregcap (1–2) .31 .095
(1.46) (1.57)
excregcap (>2) .48 .11
(1.55) (1.34)
expense ratio –.044* –.050* –.013* –.013*
(–2.21) (–2.51) (–2.47) (–2.51)
hpchange –.067 –.050 –.0044 –.0042
(–1.15) (–1.40) (–.33) (–.32)
(Year fixed effects
not shown)
Estimation procedure: Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial Tobit Tobit
regression regression regression regression
No. of obs. 170 170 170 170
No. of BHCs 17 17 17 17
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Note: t-statistics in parentheses. . +, *, and ** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels,
respectively. Two of thirty-eight BHCs are omitted from the analysis because they made no
acquisitions during the time period.
The Relationship Between Merger Activity and “Excess Regulatory Capital” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U. S. BHCs with more than $15 Billion in Assets
as of June 30, 2003, Panel Data Estimation for the Period 1993–2002, with Year
and BHC Fixed Effects
Dependent variable Number of Number of Ratio of Assets Ratio of Assets
Mergers Mergers Acquired to Acquired to
Total Assets Total Assets
excregcap .14+ .033
(1.91) (1.43)
excregcap (1–2) .42* .065
(2.32) (1.38)
excregcap (>2) .57* .082
(2.49) (1.39)
expense ratio –.018 –.021+ –.0077* –.0080*
(–1.52) (–1.79) (–2.51) (–2.62)
hpchange –.031 –.031 –.01 –.01
(–.98) (–.98) (–1.30) (–1.25)
(Year fixed effects
not shown)
Estimation procedure: Neg. Binomial Neg. Binomial Tobit Tobit
regression regression regression regression
No. of obs. 360 360 360 360
No. of BHCs 36 36 36 36
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1 Assumes unequal variance. Differences may reflect rounding error.
Yearly Averages of the Number of Mergers Before and After “Prompt Corrective
Action” and the Change from Before to After “Prompt Corrective Action” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U.S. BHCs with greater than $50 Billion in Assets
as of June 30, 2003
(1) (2) (3)
Average number of Average number of Change
mergers per year, mergers per year, between the
1987–1989 1991–1992 two periods
(a) BHCs not constrained before but
constrained after “prompt corrective
action” (9 obs) 1.63 .61 –1.02
(b) BHCs not constrained
in either period (7 obs) 1.33 1.50 .17
(c) Difference between
the groups, (a) – (b) .30 –.89  –1.19
(d)t-statistic forthedifference in (c)
1 .54 –1.35 –1.46
Appendix 47Table 8
1 Assumes unequal variance. Differences may reflect rounding error.
Yearly Averages of the Number of Mergers Before and After “Prompt Corrective
Action” and the Change from Before to After “Prompt Corrective Action” for
Mandatory A-IRB BHCs and other U.S. BHCs with greater than $15 Billion in Assets
as of June 30, 2003
(1) (2) (3)
Average number of Average number of Change
mergers per year, mergers per year, between the
1987–1989 1991–1992 two periods
(a) BHCs not constrained before but
constrained after “prompt corrective
action” (11 obs) 1.48 .54 –.94
(b) BHCs not constrained
in either period (17 obs) 1.08 .76 –.31
(c) Difference between
the groups, (a) – (b) .41 –.22 –.63
(d)t-statistic forthedifference in (c)
1 .91 –.64 –1.18
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